Viasat Satellite Communications Deep-Dive

If Viasat's development is divided into stages, the clearest split is probably four phases. The first runs from founding to the mid-2000s, the "defense data-link and private-network equipment period," centered on surviving through defense projects and deepening expertise in modems, anti-jamming, spectral efficiency, and encryption. The second runs from the late 2000s to 2022, the "equipment to network operations period," when the company turned Ka-band high-throughput satellites, consumer and enterprise broadband, and aviation in-flight connectivity into new growth engines. The business model shifted from one-time equipment sales to mixed revenue from equipment, terminals, and services. The third was the 2023 "global acquisition and unexpected wall period." Inmarsat was consolidated on 2023-05-31, giving Viasat the global L-band mobile satellite network, maritime, and international aviation customer base in one step. Almost at the same time, ViaSat-3 F1 suffered a main antenna deployment anomaly, interrupting what had been the cleanest capacity story. The fourth phase is the present. Since FY2025, reporting has shifted to two major segments, Communication Services and DAT, and capital markets have moved from "can acquisition integration be completed" to "can cash flow, separation, and multi-orbit strategy be delivered."

The 2023 Inmarsat acquisition was the real turning point in the company's fate. It quickly pushed Viasat from an operator tilted toward North America, Ka-band, aviation, and fixed broadband into a global satellite communications platform with Ka/L/S multi-band assets covering aviation, maritime, government, fixed, and narrowband mobile services. The price was also heavy. At closing, the company added a 2023 term loan, and in 2024 it further restructured Inmarsat's secured loans and revolving credit, making the debt structure materially thicker. The company later redeemed the 2025 Notes and then relied on operating cash flow, one-time Ligado cash, asset disposals, and Ex-Im financing to optimize the maturity profile. By the end of FY2026, management's numbers were about USD 4.8 billion of net debt and about USD 2.9 billion of available liquidity. But the debt detail still leaves the coming years sensitive to refinancing, given 2027 Notes, 2028 Notes, Inmarsat 2029 Notes, the 2022/2023 term loan, and 2031 Notes. The current story has moved from "does the company have debt" to "can it gradually pay it down with lower capex."

ViaSat-3 F1 is another dividing line. The company confirmed in 2023 that F1's main Ka reflector had suffered a deployment anomaly, and management later made clear that it no longer planned to launch a replacement satellite. That meant the market's earlier main thesis, that ultra-large GEO capacity would re-open a gap in fixed and aviation broadband, had to be rewritten. The company had insurance coverage and put F1 into North American commercial aviation service in 2024, but F1 was downgraded from a super-asset that could change the valuation center to a usable supplemental asset below design capability. Two subsequent events did more to repair market confidence. First, F2 testing continued to progress. Second, F3 was successfully launched by Falcon Heavy in April 2026, with a target to enter Asia-Pacific service in late summer 2026. If both F2 and F3 can contribute capacity normally, the peak capex cycle has a better chance of ending, and the market can more readily believe in a post-Inmarsat, post-anomaly free-cash-flow platform.

From a longitudinal financial perspective, three facts are clearest. First, before the acquisition, Viasat was a platform with annual revenue of roughly USD 2.0 billion to USD 2.6 billion and adjusted EBITDA of USD 400 million to USD 500 million. Revenue was about USD 2.3 billion in 2020 and about USD 2.56 billion in 2023, showing that aviation, government, and fixed broadband could deliver growth, but scale remained limited. Second, after the acquisition, revenue jumped directly into the USD 4.5 billion range, at about USD 4.5 billion in FY2025 and about USD 4.64 billion in FY2026. Scale increased, but profit quality did not simultaneously become lighter because depreciation, amortization, interest, and the capex needed to maintain network capability remained heavy. Third, the real improvement appeared in cash flow: FY2024 operating cash flow was USD 688 million, FY2025 was about USD 908 million, and FY2026 reported operating cash flow was about USD 1.59 billion. Excluding the USD 420 million one-time Ligado payment, FY2026 operating cash flow was about USD 1.17 billion and free cash flow was about USD 177 million. In other words, Viasat has finally begun to prove that the larger post-acquisition platform can produce cash, but it remains far from an asset-light compounder.

The history of stock price and valuation can also be read along this line. The market once treated Viasat as a defense communications equipment company, then as a high-throughput satellite growth stock. Around the 2023 acquisition, it briefly approached the narrative high point of a "global satellite network consolidator," then was quickly brought back to reality by the ViaSat-3 F1 anomaly and high leverage. In May 2024, weak fixed broadband and conservative guidance drove an intraday stock drop of more than 11%. By 2025 to 2026, the stock restarted on a new narrative of cash flow, DAT, strategic review, and space-defense orders, rather than a broad recovery of the core base. Today's valuation looks like a combination of two forces: the discount of a traditional GEO operator and the premium of a defense and multi-orbit platform.

Business Model and Moat

Viasat's current revenue structure is more complicated than it appears. Since FY2025, the company has disclosed two major segments. Communication Services covers aviation IFC, government SATCOM, maritime, fixed, and other broadband. DAT covers information security and cyber defense, space and mission systems, tactical networking, and advanced technologies. In reviewing FY2026 results, the FY2027 guidance table gave segment revenue: Communication Services at about USD 3.30 billion and DAT at about USD 1.341 billion. Communications services remain the revenue majority, but DAT is already large enough to influence what valuation framework the market applies to the company. Within Communication Services, aviation is the most important growth engine, while fixed broadband is the clearest drag. In FY2026, management described Communication Services as a mix of double-digit aviation growth and slower declines in fixed and other, and described DAT as a mix of double-digit growth in information security, cyber defense, and space systems.

The true profit sources are therefore not equal across all communications-service revenue. Fixed residential broadband and some traditional GEO capacity sales are more vulnerable to pricing pressure from LEO and wireless alternatives. Aviation, government SATCOM, and maritime are much better because customers care about more than one speed test. They care about global coverage, certifications, airborne installation, existing service interfaces, airline operations workflows, and security capability. DAT follows another logic. It is closer to a hybrid of project and platform businesses in defense electronics, mission systems, and encryption security. Its cycle is affected by U.S. government budgets, but customer switching is much slower than in ordinary commercial broadband. The U.S. Space Force PTS-G order received in June 2026 is the most direct new evidence behind the DAT value reset.

On cost structure, Viasat has an obvious two-layer profile. Communications services are a typical high-fixed-cost business: satellite construction, launch, ground stations, gateways, network software, international regulation, and spectrum maintenance are all heavy. Once capacity is in orbit and equipment is installed, incremental high-quality traffic can carry high marginal profit. But if demand is insufficient or product mix worsens, fixed costs can quickly flatten margins. DAT is more like a project business with high R&D and high certification barriers. Fixed costs are lower than in communications services, but talent, IR&D, and classified-compliance requirements are heavier. FY2026 capex was about USD 993 million, with cash of USD 1.75 billion and total available liquidity of USD 2.9 billion at the end of Q4. This shows Viasat remains a company that cannot avoid ongoing capital investment, although the most expensive phase of satellite construction may now have passed.

I think four parts of the moat truly hold. The first is spectrum and orbital-slot assets, especially the global L-band mobile satellite network brought by Inmarsat. L-band throughput is far below Ka/Ku, but it has unique value in high-reliability, all-weather, maritime safety, government mobile communications, IoT, and safety-critical scenarios. Iridium's continued existence as another narrowband/mobile satellite company with high profitability and high multiples provides indirect confirmation. The second is aviation and government customer relationships. Switching an airline's in-flight connectivity provider is not as simple as downloading an app. It involves antennas, STC certification, aircraft downtime, passenger-experience systems, and contract cycles. Government customers place even greater weight on anti-jamming, classified certifications, and mission-system compatibility. The third is multi-orbit integration capability. The company has signed with Telesat to bring Lightspeed LEO capacity into its multi-orbit roadmap, which at least keeps it from passively taking hits inside pure GEO. The fourth is defense, encryption, and mission-system capability. This looks more like DAT's independent moat than a mere appendage to a communications-services premium.

Conversely, the moat most often promoted by the market but now weakening, in my view, is the idea that as long as total GEO capacity is large enough, Viasat will naturally win. Once Starlink turned low latency and high availability into a felt user experience, that logic stopped being automatic. GEO's capacity efficiency, wide-area coverage, and economics still have value, but in fixed broadband and some premium airline scenarios, the experience gap can directly affect wins. That is why Viasat today says it will be an orchestrator across multiple frequency bands, multiple orbits, and multiple networks, rather than saying it will defeat LEO with GEO. The moat remains, but its shape has changed.

Governance also puts Viasat in an interesting position. Mark Dankberg is both founder and current chairman and CEO, which helps ensure consistency in strategy and engineering direction. It also means the company's risk appetite for large projects and large acquisitions in recent years has carried a strong founder imprint. One major management miss was that ViaSat-3 F1 did not meet its design objective. One major management credit was that after that, the company did not keep telling unrealistic stories. Instead, it redeemed the 2025 Notes, turned FY2026 free cash flow positive, reduced net leverage, and in 2026 signed a cooperation agreement with Carronade that put two new directors on the strategic-review committee. By May 2026, 8 of the 10 board members were independent. At minimum, this shows the company has not shut out outside shareholders' demands around separation and capital allocation.

Industry, Cycles, and Peer Comparisons

Satellite communications is no longer one unified market. Residential broadband, aviation IFC, maritime connectivity, government SATCOM, narrowband mobile satellite, safety-critical communications, and IoT assign very different weights to bandwidth, latency, terminal cost, certification, coverage, availability, and sovereignty. Profit pools are therefore unevenly distributed. Residential broadband profits are being eroded by wireless and LEO. Aviation and government SATCOM remain high-value markets. Maritime is splitting between high-bandwidth entertainment/business and low-speed, high-reliability safety communications. Narrowband and L-band can sustain better pricing precisely because mission rigidity is very strong. Viasat is exposed to several of these markets at once, so it is harder to value than a pure satellite company.

The industry's cyclicality is also not singular. Viasat is exposed simultaneously to the technology iteration cycle, capex cycle, interest-rate cycle, and government budget cycle. The technology cycle appears in GEO, MEO, and LEO route competition. The capex cycle appears in the very large difference in free cash flow before and after ViaSat-3 and Inmarsat integration. The interest-rate cycle appears in the high sensitivity of its debt-heavy structure to refinancing costs. The government budget cycle directly affects DAT growth, order timing, and cash collection. For Viasat, the most beneficial variables in an upcycle are a higher share of high-quality aviation and government revenue plus lower capex. The most fragile variables in a downcycle are faster fixed broadband attrition, ARPU pressure from aviation competition, and an unfriendly credit market when debt matures.

Horizontally, Starlink is the most direct and dangerous functional competitor. Reuters wrote clearly in June 2026 that Starlink had already signed aviation contracts covering more than 7,000 aircraft and added 11 airline customers in 2026. Why do users choose it? The answer is practical: low latency, fast speeds, a strong brand, and a simple terminal ecosystem. For many passengers, feeling as smooth as a terrestrial network matters more than theoretically larger total capacity. Amazon Kuiper has not fully arrived, but it has already secured aviation partnerships, showing that "non-geostationary orbit plus a big-tech ecosystem" does appeal to airline procurement. Viasat's advantages against these rivals are its global spectrum portfolio, long civil-aviation certification experience, L-band safety and backup capability, and integrated delivery for government and complex scenarios, rather than speed alone. The question is how much these advantages are worth in premium airline procurement, and the market does not yet have a final answer.

SES and Eutelsat-OneWeb are another kind of reference. After consolidating Intelsat in 2025, SES reported revenue of about EUR 2.627 billion and adjusted EBITDA of about EUR 1.196 billion, but comparable revenue and EBITDA remained under pressure. That shows legacy GEO businesses did not suddenly improve. Integration can improve scale and government/mobility positioning, but it cannot eliminate industry pressure. Eutelsat shows the European path of "declining legacy GEO business plus growing OneWeb/LEO business." For the fiscal year ended 2025-06-30, its revenue was about EUR 1.24 billion and LEO revenue grew 84%, but margins remained pressured. The market pays more attention to its sovereign and geopolitical role than to pure economics. Customers often choose these companies because they are non-U.S., multi-regional, government-acceptable alternative networks, not because they are the strongest. Viasat is similar to them in moving from single-orbit thinking to composite networks. It differs because DAT gives it a business for which capital markets are willing to pay a premium beyond a pure operator.

Iridium is the most important counterexample comparison. Its network capacity is far below Viasat's, and it does not focus on high-speed in-flight internet. But 2025 total service revenue was about USD 634 million and OEBITDA was about USD 495 million. This shows that if a product definition sits in the narrow but deep demand pocket of safety-critical, mobile narrowband, and globally reliable communications, an L-band/mobile satellite business can become a high-quality cash-flow asset. The market therefore gives Iridium a higher valuation multiple. In theory, the L-band assets Viasat obtained from Inmarsat also have this value. In practice, that value is diluted by the heavier, more complex, more competitive broadband business inside Communication Services.

Telesat is also interesting because it is both a potential competitor and a Viasat partner. Telesat's 2025 revenue was about USD 418 million and adjusted EBITDA was about USD 213 million, far smaller than Viasat, but its equity story is almost entirely tied to the Lightspeed LEO option. Viasat's decision to sign a long-term contract with Telesat rather than fully build its own LEO shows a pragmatic understanding of multi-orbit strategy: instead of rebuilding the most expensive piece itself, it can first keep customer relationships, spectrum, terminals, and services under its own control, then use external LEO to fill network gaps. The benefit is lower capital intensity. The downside is that part of the strategic lifeline is in someone else's hands.

EchoStar/Hughes is the listed mirror closest to Viasat's old fixed-broadband dilemma, but it has now been heavily distorted by SpaceX spectrum transactions and asset-rerating noise. EchoStar's 2025 total revenue was about USD 15.0 billion, and in 2026 the market treated it more as a SpaceX transaction and spectrum-asset story than as a pure operating comparison. Still, revenue at its Hughes broadband and satellite-services segment declined year over year in Q1 2025, which also indicates that pressure on residential and traditional satellite broadband is industry-wide rather than unique to Viasat.

The following table includes only the listed companies the market most often uses for valuation comparison. Its purpose is to help explain why the market is willing to give higher multiples to purer, sharper stories such as Iridium and Telesat, but not to give Viasat the same treatment. It is not saying "buy whichever looks cheapest."

The multiple differences in the table essentially reflect differences in business quality, not just market sentiment. Iridium's high multiple comes from more stable recurring service revenue and clearer product boundaries. Telesat's high multiple comes from LEO option pricing. EchoStar's multiple is distorted by asset transactions and lower-quality EBITDA. Viasat sits in the middle. It is worth more than a pure declining GEO asset because it has DAT and L-band. It cannot receive the valuation of a pure LEO or pure safety-critical communications story because the communications-services side remains too heavy, too mixed, and too squeezed by competition.

Current Fundamentals, Market Narrative, and Bull-Bear Debate

Returning to the present, Viasat's latest condition is much healthier than it was in 2023. For FY2026, revenue was about USD 4.64 billion, up about 3% year over year. Adjusted EBITDA was about USD 1.55 billion, roughly flat but a record. Free cash flow was about USD 177 million, or about USD 597 million if the USD 420 million Ligado one-time payment is included. Year-end backlog was about USD 4.07 billion, up 15% year over year. Net debt fell to about USD 4.8 billion. FY2027 guidance calls for mid-single-digit total revenue growth, with Communication Services growing low single digits and DAT growing in the mid-teens, adjusted EBITDA flat to slightly up, and capex falling further to USD 950 million to USD 1.00 billion. Taken alone, these numbers show that the company has moved from a risky, heavily indebted project stock to a platform stock that can produce real cash but is not yet light.

Looking at the most recent quarters, structure matters more than total volume. Q1 FY2026 total revenue was about USD 1.171 billion, with DAT quarterly revenue of about USD 344 million. Q3 FY2026 revenue was about USD 1.2 billion, adjusted EBITDA was USD 387 million, DAT revenue grew 9% year over year, and backlog rose to USD 1.2 billion. Q4 FY2026 revenue was about USD 1.171 billion, adjusted EBITDA was USD 370 million, and DAT revenue grew 12% year over year. Management has repeatedly emphasized the same highlights: aviation keeps growing, government SATCOM and DAT improve mix quality, and declines in fixed and other businesses are slowing rather than reversing. The fundamental improvement is real, but it mainly comes from a higher share of quality businesses, not from every business line improving.

The market is therefore trading four narrower themes, not a broad earnings explosion. First, deleveraging: FY2026 debt repayment was about USD 743 million and leverage fell to 3.1x, showing the company can finally use cash flow to improve the capital structure. Second, standalone DAT valuation: Carronade publicly advocated a DAT separation or IPO in 2025, then reached a cooperation agreement with the company in May 2026 and entered the strategic-review process. Third, lower capex: the successful ViaSat-3 F3 launch and progress on F2 testing make it more credible that the heaviest investment phase is nearly over. Fourth, defense space orders: the PTS-G Swarm 1 order received in June 2026 reinforces that DAT is not just a paper story.

The strongest bullish evidence has three parts. First, DAT is already an asset the market is willing to price separately, not a side business. DAT revenue in the FY2026 guidance review reached USD 1.341 billion, management continues to guide for mid-teens FY2027 growth, and the company recently won a new U.S. Space Force project. Second, aviation and government businesses remain sticky. Reuters noted in August 2024 that aviation and defense demand led the company to raise its FY2025 revenue outlook. By the end of FY2026, the company also disclosed about 4,450 commercial aircraft in service and roughly 1,000 more in backlog. Third, cash-flow improvement has begun to happen. FY2026 reported operating cash flow was about USD 1.59 billion, or about USD 1.17 billion excluding Ligado. Free cash flow turned positive, and FY2027 capex is set to fall further.

The strongest bearish evidence is also substantial. First, Starlink's advance in aviation is strikingly fast. Contracts covering more than 7,000 aircraft and continuing airline customer additions will affect Viasat's new wins and pricing, not merely pose a theoretical threat. The company itself already expects FY2027 aviation growth to slow because of competition. Second, fixed broadband is still declining, and this is a category being replaced by LEO and terrestrial wireless, not an execution issue. When the company gave conservative guidance in May 2024, the market immediately voted with the stock price. Third, although debt is no longer as dangerous as it was in 2023, it is far from negligible. The Q1 FY2026 10-Q clearly shows the scale of 2027 Notes, 2028 Notes, 2029 Notes, and term loans. The USD 100 million Ligado payment originally due on 2026-03-31 was also allowed by the court to be deferred. For a company proving its valuation through lower capex, the downside outcome is still "cash flow delivery is one year slower and valuation drops one tier," not simply "more volatility."

Publicly verifiable primary materials are insufficient for me to state detailed sell-side consensus upgrades or downgrades with too much certainty. More important is that the next real market repricing will come from several larger questions, not a few cents of EPS revision: whether F3 enters service on schedule in late summer 2026; what F2's final status is; whether FY2027 Communication Services can hold low-single-digit growth; whether DAT backlog keeps accelerating; and whether the strategic review leads to asset sales, an IPO, or purely operational optimization.

Valuation, Risks, Catalysts, and Cross-Sectional/Longitudinal Summary

Start by looking through cash flow. On the surface, Viasat does not look expensive at all. At the market price, MarketWatch shows EV/EBITDA of about 9.82x, EV/Sales of about 3.10x, and Price/Cash Flow of about 3.88x. If FY2026 reported free cash flow of USD 597 million is used directly, the equity free-cash-flow yield also looks decent. The problem is that this apparent cheapness contains two distortions. One is the USD 420 million Ligado one-time payment. The other is that the company is still moving from an ultra-high capex period toward a normalized period, so historical capex has not fully represented long-term maintenance capex. The company does not disclose an exact split between maintenance and growth capex, so I can only estimate a range. Given FY2026 capex of about USD 993 million, which clearly includes the tail end of ViaSat-3 and Inmarsat-related investment, I am more inclined to treat 45% to 55% as maintenance and the rest as growth. On that basis, FY2026 operating cash flow excluding Ligado was about USD 1.17 billion, implying owner earnings of roughly USD 570 million to USD 720 million. Relative to current equity value, the owner-earnings yield is only about 5.5% to 7.0%, which is not cheap.

From a historical-label perspective, Viasat's valuation center has changed. In the past, the market either gave it a "satellite growth stock" premium or, after accidents and debt shocks, a "high-leverage GEO operator" discount. Its current center looks more like a hybrid of defense optionality, multi-orbit platform, and falling capex. That gives it a multiple above most old GEO peers, but below purer and sharper stories such as Iridium and Telesat. Whether that center is sustainable depends on two things: whether Communication Services can prove it is not a structurally declining asset, and whether DAT can help the group obtain a higher blended multiple even without a separation.

The valuation below does not constitute investment advice. It simply compresses current facts into three frameworks to see what the stock price implies.

I set the core price ranges at: conservative USD 45 to USD 55, neutral USD 60 to USD 80, and optimistic USD 90 to USD 115. This range incorporates FY2026 cash-flow capacity after excluding one-time items, FY2027 guidance for lower capex, current net debt of about USD 4.8 billion, and the upper-bound multiples available to higher-quality peer assets. It is not based on a single rough multiple. If DAT trades separately, valuation could of course be higher than on a group basis. But until DAT is actually separated, the group stock price still has to absorb the Communication Services discount.

The margin of safety answer is clear when viewed separately. Under the conservative range above, the current price is clearly above conservative implied value, so the margin of safety is zero. The most fragile assumption among the three cases is that maintenance capex has already stepped down clearly. If only 70% of that assumption is delivered, my neutral valuation would move directly from about USD 60 to USD 80 down to about USD 45 to USD 60. If earnings and owner earnings do not grow over the next three years, the annualized return at the current price would be closer to low single digits than mid-teens. This is a classic case of "the company has improved, but the price has already been bid up first." For existing positions, this is not necessarily a sell signal. For new money, it is at least not a position with an obvious margin of safety. My conclusion on margin-of-safety sufficiency is: none.

I see five risks that could truly cause permanent capital loss. First, Starlink/Kuiper could continue taking aviation share. This is high probability and medium-high impact. Observable indicators are new contracts with major airlines, retention of installed customers, and aviation ARPU. If two or three large projects go to Starlink/Kuiper in the next year, both Communication Services growth and valuation would be hurt. Second, capex may not fall as expected. This is medium probability and high impact. The market is willing to pay a higher price now largely because it is betting that the heaviest satellite investment phase is over. If F2/F3 or ground infrastructure keeps slipping, owner earnings will continue to be consumed. Third, debt refinancing risk is medium probability and medium-high impact. Near-term liquidity has improved, but the 2027 to 2030 debt wall remains. If credit conditions deteriorate, equity valuation can be compressed easily. Fourth, Ligado cash realization may be incomplete. This is medium probability and medium impact. The earlier expectation was to receive USD 568 million in FY2026, but the court has allowed Ligado to defer a USD 100 million payment, so this cash should no longer be treated as unconditional. Fifth, the narrative could give back if separation or the strategic review fails to deliver. This is medium probability and medium impact. Part of DAT's value has already been prepaid in the stock price. If the final result is only "continued review, no transaction," the market will quickly remove part of the premium.

Positive catalysts are also clear. F3 enters service as planned in late summer 2026. F2 testing is completed successfully. FY2027 capex truly falls below USD 1.0 billion. DAT wins more space and secure-communications projects. The strategic review provides an executable path, even if it is asset disposals and clearer capital allocation rather than a separation. Negative catalysts are equally clear: major airlines switch to Starlink/Kuiper, Communication Services guidance is cut again, free cash flow turns negative again, later Ligado payments remain blocked, or the strategic review ends without a result.

I would view the following tracking table as the most useful items to monitor.

These indicators matter because they all map to the same question: the market's current premium for Viasat comes more from the judgment that cash flow will be better over the next two years than from the fact that the past two years of reported results finally look better. Any metric that affects that judgment deserves more attention than single-quarter EPS. The most practical tracking sources remain company quarterly shareholder letters, 10-Q/10-K filings, major order announcements, and customer-win news from major competitors.

Pulling all the threads together, the capability Viasat has truly proven over its history is that it can combine complex communications engineering, government customer relationships, and global satellite-network operations into a hard-to-replicate platform over decades. It has not proven that every satellite can succeed on schedule, nor that every acquisition immediately monetizes beautifully. Half of its past success came from era tailwinds, and half came from engineering depth and customer penetration. The latter still works today. What has failed or weakened is the old logic that continuously spending GEO capex would automatically translate into higher returns. Viasat's real advantage versus peers today is that it understands complex-scenario customers better than traditional GEO operators and understands global satellite services better than pure defense electronics companies. Its real weakness is that the communications-services portion remains under heavy LEO-competition valuation pressure, and its multi-orbit strategy is still not fully in its own hands. I think the market is most likely to misjudge two points: first, it may underestimate the valuation-floor support from DAT and L-band assets; second, it may overestimate how quickly they can lift the group stock price in the short term. DAT can raise the floor, but it may not immediately pull the entire group up to pure defense-stock valuation.

The most important variables over the next 1 year are F2/F3 service progress, delivery of FY2027 capex/FCF, and whether the strategic review gives capital markets an executable action. Over 3 years, the key variable is whether Communication Services can re-prove its moat in aviation, government, and maritime while keeping fixed broadband drag manageable. Over 5 years, the key variable is whether Viasat can evolve from a capital-intensive network operator into a multi-orbit service coordinator plus defense-technology platform, letting cash flow rather than a single satellite story determine valuation. If the stock rises first over the next year while these variables are not delivered, the stock will become fragile again. Conversely, if the stock returns to the USD 45 to USD 55 range while capex continues to fall, DAT keeps growing, and the strategic review remains active, the company would become a better investment candidate.

I see four bullish reasons. First, DAT is already large and fast enough for the market to value it separately. Second, aviation, government SATCOM, and L-band assets show Viasat is not simply a residential broadband asset being replaced. Third, FY2026 proved that cash flow can improve after the capex peak, and leverage is genuinely falling. Fourth, the strategic review, asset disposals, and board refresh provide capital-market catalysts. I also see four bearish reasons. First, LEO's experience advantage in aviation and fixed broadband is real and has already converted into orders. Second, the asset-heavy nature of Communication Services means margins will not automatically improve if high-quality incremental revenue is insufficient. Third, debt pressure has fallen but has not disappeared, and it will still cap the valuation center over the coming years. Fourth, even if DAT is highly valuable, that value may not be fully reflected in the group stock price without a separation.

If I were doing a pre-mortem, there are two credible 50% loss scenarios. The first occurs in 2027 to 2028: Starlink keeps winning more major airlines and premium maritime customers, Viasat is forced to cut prices sharply in aviation and maritime, Communication Services revenue returns to low-single-digit negative growth, adjusted EBITDA falls to USD 1.3 billion to USD 1.4 billion, and the market compresses group EV/EBITDA from 9 to 10x back toward 7x, potentially sending the stock into the USD 30s. The second occurs at the capital-market level: the 2026 to 2027 strategic review produces no result, later Ligado payments continue to shift, F2/F3 commercialization is later than expected, capex falls more slowly than guidance, and investors realize that DAT is valuable but the group cannot receive a pure DAT multiple. Funds that previously bet on a separation then exit, and the stock could also halve.

The final research conclusion can be reduced to a plain sentence: Viasat has now moved out of its most dangerous phase, but it has not entered a phase where it can be held blindly for the long term. It deserves serious study because DAT, L-band, aviation, and government businesses make it much better than a typical GEO peer. It should not be bought at any price because around the low USD 70s, the market has already paid in advance for many improvements. The current price is more suitable for treating it as a rerating asset to hold, not as a new position with ample margin of safety. My biggest concern is that the value of Communication Services will continue to be compressed under LEO competition, leaving DAT good enough to form a floor but not enough to form the upside. Short-term volatility is not the central issue. The conditions that would change my view are also clear: either the price returns to USD 45 to USD 55, or the company proves through several consecutive quarters of capex, FCF, aviation wins, and strategic actions that it deserves a higher center.

【Company Profile Score】

• Fundamental quality: Medium

• Growth: Medium

• Moat: Medium

• Financial resilience: Medium

• Management credibility: Medium

• Valuation attractiveness: Low

• Risk level: High

• Suitable investor type: Event-driven

【Investment Rating】

• Rating: Hold

• One-sentence investment thesis: Defense and aviation are improving cash flow, but LEO competition and debt make the current price suitable only for holding.

• Three-tier price signal: Ideal buy price: see next line

• Holdable price: 60 to 80 USD

• Clearly overvalued price: 90 to 115 USD

• Current price category: Holdable

• Worth waiting for a better price: Yes. For new capital, USD 45 to USD 55 better covers the triple uncertainty of technology, competition, and refinancing. The opportunity cost of waiting is that if a DAT transaction accelerates or F3 commercialization beats expectations, the stock may not return to that range.

• Target holding period: 1 to 3 years

• Expected annualized return: conservative about -12%; neutral about +2%; optimistic about +13%

• Maximum loss risk: about 50% to 60%; the trigger would be aviation/maritime competition pushing Communication Services revenue negative again, while capex fails to fall on schedule, separation expectations fail, and the valuation multiple returns to around 7x.

• Signals that trigger reassessment: If Communication Services turns negative year over year for two consecutive quarters

• If DAT growth falls below 5% and backlog no longer grows

• If FY2027 capex does not fall below USD 1.0 billion

• If net leverage rises again above 3.4x

• If F2/F3 commercialization is delayed by more than two quarters

【Ideal/Fair Buy Price】45 to 55 USD

Basis: This range corresponds to conservative-case implied value and leaves a margin of safety of at least about 20% versus current technology, competition, and capital-structure risks.

【Valuation Range】

• current: 72.73, as of the 2026-06-12 close

• bear, conservative ideal-buy zone: [45, 55]

• base, reasonable acceptable-hold zone: [60, 80]

• bull, optimistic and above the clearly overvalued line: [90, 115]

The key data table is included here to anchor the judgments above in numbers.

In the table above, FY2022/FY2023 are from the 2023 annual report; FY2025 is from the 2025 annual report, FY2024/FY2025 cash-flow disclosures, and FY2026 year-over-year framing; and FY2026 is from the FY2026 results release. FY2026 operating cash flow and free cash flow in the table exclude the USD 420 million Ligado one-time payment, which is more appropriate for valuation. On a reported basis, FY2026 operating cash flow was about USD 1.59 billion and free cash flow was about USD 597 million. † indicates exclusion of the Ligado one-time payment.

Research uncertainty has four main points. First, older public webpages do not use fully consistent split-adjusted framing for the 1996 IPO, so I did not treat the first-day price as a core argument. Second, FY2026 annual net loss appears in secondary summaries as both about USD 28 million and USD 34.1 million. I use the figure closer to the widely cited company-results framing, "about USD 34.1 million attributable to common shareholders." Third, the company does not publicly disclose a detailed split between maintenance capex and growth capex, so I can only estimate a range based on the business stage. Fourth, the timing of the USD 100 million Ligado payment originally due on 2026-03-31 has legal uncertainty, so I do not treat it as certain cash in the valuation.

Reference sources are mainly primary disclosures: Viasat's website and investor-relations pages, the FY2025 annual report, FY2026 annual report/8-K/shareholder letter, FY2026 Q1 10-Q, the July 2024 new segment disclosure note, the 2025 Ligado settlement announcement, the May 2026 cooperation agreement with Carronade, and the June 2026 U.S. Space Force PTS-G announcement. Peer sections mainly use the latest results disclosures from SES, Iridium, Telesat, Eutelsat, and EchoStar. Competition and market-reaction sections are supplemented by mainstream media such as Reuters.

Other Securities Mentioned in the Report

• IRDM.US — Provides the closest clean valuation reference for Viasat's L-band assets through a highly profitable L-band/narrowband mobile satellite business

• TSAT.US — Both a potential LEO substitute and Viasat's partner in its multi-orbit strategy

• SATS.US — Hughes fixed satellite broadband and spectrum assets provide a comparison for the pressure on Viasat's fixed broadband

• GILT.US — A terminal and network-equipment reference, illustrating the "picks and shovels" valuation logic in the satellite communications chain

• SESG.PA — A traditional GEO/MEO operator transformation sample, showing how the market prices older satellite platforms after integration

• ETL.PA — Eutelsat-OneWeb's GEO+LEO transformation sample, reflecting the valuation logic of sovereign alternative networks

• BA.L — One of the ViaSat-3 satellite manufacturers; project execution and satellite risk can indirectly affect Viasat

• LHX.US — A counterparty in the Link 16 tactical data-link business and a defense-electronics comparable

This report is based on public information and does not constitute investment advice. Markets carry risk; invest with caution.