Boqian New Materials: SUN-R Investment Analysis Framework Research Report

Hunting ten-year five-baggers among great growth stocks — pressing the upside question: "Can it get much bigger?"

• QHow high is its market ceiling? Is it enlarging a slice of an existing pie, or creating an entirely new market?5/10

  A

  Conclusion: Boqian New Materials' market ceiling is not low, but its nature is more like "enlarging, upgrading, and domestically substituting the existing MLCC / high-end metal powder pie" than creating an entirely new market. Judging by the 2026-06-08 close of RMB 173.00 and total market cap of about RMB 45.257 billion, the market is already pricing the long term as a "core supplier of high-end MLCC nickel powder + powder platformization"; whereas the company's 2025 revenue of RMB 1.152 billion and net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 219 million, and Q1 2026 revenue of RMB 410 million and net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 71.63 million, show that today's revenue base is still very small, and the ceiling must be realized through downstream high-end upgrading and share gains.

  The first layer of TAM is the upgrade of MLCC internal-electrode powders. The company's annual report applies nickel powder and copper powder mainly to MLCCs, alloy powder to inductors, and silver-coated copper powder to photovoltaic low-silver/silver-free applications, and explicitly says downstream demand comes from AI servers, new-energy vehicles, high-end consumer electronics, photovoltaics, and other scenarios; the same annual report discloses that AI-server demand is growing strongly year over year, that a single NVIDIA GB300 AI server uses about 30,000 MLCCs—about 30 times a traditional smartphone—and that new-energy vehicles and high-end ADAS / 800V platforms also markedly raise MLCC usage per vehicle. More critically, over 90% of MLCCs globally use the BME technology system, with nickel as the main internal electrode material, and high-end MLCCs require finer particle size, higher sphericity, and more uniformly distributed nickel powder. This shows the question it faces is not "is there demand" but that, after the high-end MLCC upgrade, material specs and supplier certification concentrate value toward a few high-end powder makers.

  The second layer is the company's own capturable space. In 2025 nickel-based product revenue was RMB 862 million with a gross margin of 37.54%, already the revenue backbone; Company X's fulfillment from August to December 2025 was RMB 233 million, and the research report records that the August-2025-to-December-2029 long order projects 5,420-6,495 tonnes and roughly RMB 4.3-5.0 billion, effectively locking part of the next few years' nickel powder demand in order form ahead of time. In 2026 the company further announced a project for annual output of 640 tonnes of ultrafine metal powder materials, with investment of about RMB 120 million and a 36-month construction period, with project demand pointing to AI servers, new-energy vehicles, high-end consumer electronics, and photovoltaic low-silver/silver-free applications. In other words, TAM is not just an industry slogan; it has already begun to be reflected in customer long orders and capacity decisions.

  But this is still not "new-market creation." AI servers, automotive electronics, consumer electronics, and photovoltaics inherently need MLCCs, inductors, and conductive pastes; what Boqian does is upgrade ordinary powder into ultrafine, high-consistency powder that can pass leading-customer certification, and raise its share in the domestic supply chain. The blue-sky scenario is that the company expands from MLCC nickel powder leader into a "high-end powder platform," simultaneously capturing the adjacent markets of copper powder, alloy powder, and silver-coated copper powder; the conservative scenario is that it only ramps within high-end MLCC nickel powder along the cycle and with a single large customer, with the ceiling pulled down by customer concentration, capacity-expansion pace, and cash-flow constraints. Therefore, the conclusion for Q1 should be: TAM is large enough to support a growth story, but its core is the high-end upgrading and domestic-share migration of the existing electronic-materials pie, rather than creating an entirely new demand pool from scratch.

  Jun 8, 2026
• QCan its revenue at least double over the next five years? Is growth driven mainly by volume, price, or new business?5/10

  A

  Conclusion: doubling revenue over the next five years is possible, but not an unconditional base case. Taking 2025 revenue of RMB 1.152 billion as the base, a five-year doubling means annual revenue of at least above RMB 2.3 billion; Q1 2026 revenue of RMB 410 million, net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 71.63 million, and operating cash flow of -RMB 149 million show demand and profit are trending up, but also that growth is consuming cash, so the high Q1 growth rate cannot simply be annualized into a steady state.

  The most important driver should be volume, not simply price hikes. The core variable is the Company X nickel powder long order: the research report's figures are sales of 5,420-6,495 tonnes from August 2025 to December 2029, with an estimated value of RMB 4.3-5.0 billion; the company's annual report has confirmed RMB 233 million of fulfillment for Company X from August to December 2025, denominated in U.S. dollars and performed normally. If the remainder is fulfilled at a relatively smooth pace over 2026-2029, the remaining contract's annualized revenue already approaches a large chunk of the company's 2025 revenue; but the long order is still affected by Company X's demand, MLCC prosperity, and delivery pace, so what it provides is "an order path that can achieve a doubling," not guaranteed revenue.

  Price contribution can exist, but must be stripped of raw materials and thematic beta. In 2025 the company's nickel-based product revenue was RMB 862 million with a gross margin of 37.54%, and copper-based product revenue was RMB 121 million with a gross margin of 26.87%; the high-end product-mix improvement can indeed lift unit revenue and gross margin; but long-order pricing is not fixed at a high price—it carries raw-material price, FX, and negotiation factors, and public reports also mention that the agreement's sales value does not constitute an earnings forecast. So a revenue doubling cannot be mainly explained by "rising nickel/copper prices" or a valuation re-rating from the AI theme; what truly matters is powder shipment tonnage, product-spec upgrades, and customer-certification ramp.

  New business is the third layer of contribution, more about turning the doubling from "close" into "more solid" than being the current main engine. The company plans to build a project for annual output of 640 tonnes of ultrafine metal powder materials, with investment of about RMB 120 million and a 36-month construction period, along with capacity clues such as 800 tonnes of high-performance ultrafine copper powder and fine copper-powder grading; silver-coated copper powder, alloy powder, photovoltaic low-silver applications, and inductor powder all provide a second curve, but 2025 alloy-product revenue was only RMB 26.61 million, still small in scale, and cannot be valued in advance as a mature business.

  Therefore, the more honest base case is: a five-year doubling requires "stable fulfillment of the Company X long order + continued ramp of high-end MLCC nickel powder + copper powder/silver-coated copper powder/alloy powder contributing at least several hundred million yuan of incremental revenue + operating cash-flow repair" all holding together. If only price rises, the theme ferments, or the stock re-rates, then even though the 2026-06-08 closing price of RMB 173.00 and total market cap of about RMB 45.257 billion already reflect very strong expectations, it does not count as a doubling in revenue quality; the true verification metrics should be quarterly nickel-based sales volume, export revenue, Company X fulfillment value, new-capacity transfer to fixed assets and reaching production, and simultaneous cash-flow improvement.

  Jun 8, 2026
• QFive years out, what will take the baton as the next growth engine? Does this "second curve" exist today?4/10

  A

  Conclusion first: the baton-holder five years out is more likely not a single "new business" that has already clearly emerged, but a high-end powder platform extended from MLCC nickel powder toward copper powder, silver-coated copper powder, and alloy powder; but this second curve today only counts as "existing in products, customer validation, and capex," and cannot yet be called an independent growth engine. The main engine is still high-end MLCC nickel powder, especially Company X long-order fulfillment; the annual report discloses RMB 233 million of fulfillment value for Company X nickel powder products from August to December 2025, while 2025 total company revenue was RMB 1.152 billion and net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 219 million, showing current earnings elasticity still mainly comes from amplifying the first curve.

  From the standpoint of revenue already formed, copper powder is the closest second-curve candidate. In 2025 the company's main metal-powder-materials revenue was RMB 1.062 billion, of which nickel-based products were RMB 862 million, copper-based products RMB 121 million, and alloy products RMB 26.61 million; copper-based products are no longer zero, but relative to nickel-based they are still only about one-seventh, and alloy powder, though high-margin, is still small in scale. That is, copper powder "exists today," but is not yet a second engine capable of replacing nickel powder; alloy powder and the inductor direction look more like early high-margin options and need to see the revenue base and customer count keep expanding.

  Judgments on silver-coated copper powder and the photovoltaic low-silver direction must be more restrained. The company's annual report does position silver-coated copper powder in the photovoltaic low-silver field, and mentions a rising shipment share of high-reliability silver-coated copper powder with lower silver content; meanwhile, alloy powder is mainly used in inductors, supported by the logic of rising AI compute-device power consumption and inductors migrating toward metal soft-magnetic powder cores. But these statements mainly show that the technology routes and market directions exist; they do not equal the listed company having already disclosed orders, revenue, or profit contribution comparable to the nickel powder long order. Especially in the photovoltaic chain, low-silverization itself is affected by cell-technology routes, silver prices, and customer-introduction pace, so "having a product" cannot be directly equated with "having taken the baton."

  Capex also supports "the second curve is being cultivated," but not yet realized. In April 2026 the company announced a project for annual output of 640 tonnes of ultrafine metal powder materials, with planned investment of RMB 120 million and a 36-month construction period, with demand pointing to AI servers, new-energy vehicles, high-end consumer electronics, and photovoltaic low-silver/silver-free applications; the same announcement also discloses that over the past 12 months there have been an 800-tonne high-performance ultrafine copper powder project and a fine copper-powder grading project. If these projects reach production smoothly and pass customer validation, five years out they may push the company from "MLCC nickel powder leader" toward "multi-category high-end powder platform." But with Q1 2026 operating cash flow at -RMB 149 million and expansion still consuming working capital, the key validation of the second curve is not the narrative but the simultaneous appearance of a non-nickel revenue share, copper/silver-coated copper/alloy powder orders, project-yield ramp, and cash-flow repair.

  Jun 8, 2026
• QWhat is its core competitive advantage? Will this moat widen or narrow over the next three to five years?6/10

  A

  Conclusion: Boqian New Materials' core competitive advantage is a materials-end moat stacked from four layers—process, standards, certification, and customer relationships—rather than a single patent or single customer. In 2025 it achieved revenue of RMB 1.152 billion and net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 219 million, showing the advantage has translated into operating results; but starting from the 2026-06-08 close of RMB 173.00 and total market cap of about RMB 45.257 billion, a widening moat does not make the valuation naturally safe.

  Process layer: the company's key is nanoscale and submicron metal powders, especially MLCC internal-electrode nickel powder, which has very high requirements for particle size, sphericity, dispersibility, oxidation resistance, and batch stability. The annual report discloses that as of the end of 2025 it held 181 valid granted patents; the 640-tonne project announcement also assigns incremental demand to AI servers, new-energy vehicles, high-end consumer electronics, and photovoltaic low-silver/silver-free applications, and explicitly states that MLCC internal electrode materials raise demand for submicron/nanoscale nickel powder with high sphericity, ultrafine particle size, and high dispersibility. The essence of this moat layer is mass-production consistency: being able to do it in the lab does not equal being able to deliver stably at large scale.

  Standard layer: the company does not merely follow industry specs but participates in defining them. The annual report discloses that the company, as the sole drafting and formulating entity, led China's first industry standard for capacitor-electrode nickel powder, YS/T1338-2019, and its subsidiary Guangxin Nano also participated in the drafting and formulation of Zhejiang Province's group standard for MLCC electrode nickel powder, T/ZZB1912-2020. Standards themselves do not bring a legal monopoly, but they make it easier for leading customers to understand and validate the company's product capability, and raise the difficulty for latecomers to break into high-end customer lists on low price alone.

  Certification layer: high-end MLCC materials are not a "switch suppliers whenever the quote is lower" business. The annual report discloses that the company has passed GB/T19001-2016/ISO9001:2015 and IATF-16949 quality-management-system certifications, and downstream customers usually select suppliers only after rigorous procedural review and product testing. For customers, once powder materials affect capacitor reliability, the validation cost, quality risk, and line-stoppage risk of switching suppliers are all high; this gives Boqian's certification accumulation real stickiness.

  The customer-relationship layer is the most direct validation of the moat. The annual report discloses 2025 top-five-customer sales of RMB 875 million, accounting for 75.98% of total sales, and discloses Company X nickel powder products already fulfilled RMB 233 million from August to December 2025; the major-contract announcement shows the company's agreement with Company X projects sales of 5,420-6,495 tonnes of nickel powder from August 2025 to the end of 2029, with an estimated value of about RMB 4.3-5.0 billion, and Company X guarantees Boqian as its exclusive nickel powder supplier within mainland China. Over the next three to five years, I lean toward thinking the moat has a chance to widen, provided that the 640-tonne project with RMB 120 million and a 36-month construction period reaches production on schedule, Company X's long order keeps ramping, and second curves such as copper powder, silver-coated copper powder, and alloy powder can replicate nickel powder's certification path. The narrowing risk is also clear: high customer concentration may tilt bargaining power toward large customers; although Q1 2026 had revenue of RMB 410 million and net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 71.63 million, operating cash flow was -RMB 149 million, and if cash flow and yield cannot keep up during expansion, the moat will shift from "scarce supply" to "heavy-asset pressure"; if overseas or domestic competitors match the stability of small-particle-size nickel powder, or Company X's demand, price terms, or procurement pace change, the customer-relationship layer of the moat will also clearly narrow.

  Jun 8, 2026
• QIf its core business is disrupted, does it have the DNA for self-reinvention? How does it treat mistakes and bad news?4/10

  A

  Conclusion: it has self-reinvention DNA, but not the strong platform-type DNA to "turn around at any time." Boqian New Materials' truly transferable asset is not a single MLCC nickel powder product but the process of PVD vapor-phase-condensation preparation of ultrafine metal powder, particle-size and dispersibility control, customer certification, and industry-standard participation; the 2025 annual report discloses that the company's products already cover nickel powder, copper powder, silver powder, silver-coated copper powder, and alloy powder, with R&D investment of RMB 47.994 million and 181 valid granted patents. This shows it has a technology base to migrate from MLCC nickel powder toward copper powder, alloy powder for inductors, and silver-coated copper powder for photovoltaic low-silverization.

  But this reinvention capability must be discounted: it is an "adjacent expansion of a materials-process platform," not a software-style pivot that can quickly switch tracks. In 2025 revenue was RMB 1.152 billion and net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 219 million, and growth quality has been delivered; Company X's fulfillment of RMB 233 million from August to December 2025 also proves the high-end nickel powder main line is still ramping. The problem is that the current core narrative still clearly relies on MLCC nickel powder, the Company X long order, and capacity-expansion fulfillment; if this main line is disrupted by a substitute technology or a change in large-customer demand, second-tier products such as copper powder, silver-coated copper powder, and alloy powder still need customer validation, capacity ramp, and proof of scaled profit, and cannot seamlessly take over immediately.

  In terms of action, the company is not only telling an R&D story but betting on reinvention with capex. The 640-tonne ultrafine-metal-powder project announced in April 2026 plans investment of about RMB 120 million and a 36-month construction period, with application directions including AI servers, new-energy vehicles, high-end consumer electronics, and photovoltaic low-silverization or silver-free applications. This leans positive, because it pushes the capability boundary from "nickel powder leader" toward "high-end powder platform"; it also leans risky, because a 36-month construction period, approvals, and uncertain returns mean reinvention is a heavy-asset, slow-feedback process with cash-flow pressure.

  On the disclosure quality of mistakes and bad news, I give it "passing but not excellent." The passing part is that the company does not only report good news: the annual report discloses 2025 operating cash flow fell to RMB 135 million, Q1 2026 again disclosed revenue of RMB 410 million and net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 71.63 million but operating cash flow of -RMB 149 million, explaining it was mainly due to increased raw-material purchases; when share trading overheated, the abnormal-fluctuation announcement explained that the cumulative deviation of gains over the three consecutive trading days of May 21, 22, and 25 exceeded 20%, and that apart from the already-disclosed H-share matter and reduction plan there was no material information that should be but had not been disclosed; the drop in the controlling shareholder's and concert parties' shareholding to 25% also has an equity-change announcement. The shortfall is that disclosure is still compliance-style: on Company X's identity, order elasticity, whether the cash-flow deterioration is only stocking, and how it would contract if the expansion project falls short, no sufficiently detailed sensitivity analysis is given. Therefore, Boqian has self-reinvention DNA and is willing to disclose bad news, but has not yet shown particularly strong cultural evidence of "actively reviewing mistakes and quickly correcting capital allocation."

  Jun 8, 2026
• QDoes management (especially the founder) have long-term vision, with interests deeply tied to the company? Are they willing to sacrifice current profit for five to ten years out?5/10

  A

  Conclusion: there is some evidence of long-term vision at Boqian New Materials' management, especially that the actual controller and chairman Wang Liping (王利平) is both the founder and a long-time participant in the company's strategy, operating policy, annual plans, and investment and other major matters; the annual report also discloses that he has over 20 years of operating and management experience in the metal-powder-materials industry, serving as chairman since November 2017 and coordinating the company's future planning and development. For a high-end powder materials company, customer certification, process iteration, and stable supply all require years of accumulation, and this combination of founder-chairman plus industry experience is a positive factor for Q6.

  On "whether willing to sacrifice current profit for five to ten years out," the evidence leans positive but is not yet very strong. In 2025 revenue was RMB 1.152 billion and net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 219 million; in Q1 2026 revenue was RMB 410 million and net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 71.63 million, but operating cash flow was -RMB 149 million, which the company explains was mainly due to increased raw-material purchases. Against this backdrop, the company still advances the 640-tonne ultrafine-metal-powder project with planned investment of about RMB 120 million and a 36-month construction period, funded by its own funds or bank loans, with the announcement also cautioning that returns and progress are uncertain. This shows management is willing to bet cash and capacity on long-term customer delivery, the technology platform, and future demand, rather than only pursuing good-looking current cash flow.

  The negative is that interest alignment is not as deep as at a typical high-shareholding founder company. Under the annual report's figures, Wang Liping actually controls 26.59% of the voting rights through arrangements including Ningbo Guanghongyuan and Shenyang Investment; but subsequent equity changes show the combined shareholding of the controlling shareholder and concert parties has already dropped from 26.00% to 25.00%, with Shenyang Investment reducing 2.616 million shares—1.00% of total share capital—from May 25 to 28, 2026, and the prior reduction plan of no more than 4.5 million shares, or 1.72%, not yet fully executed. At the high-valuation phase of the June 8, 2026 closing price of RMB 173.00 and total market cap of about RMB 45.257 billion, continued reduction by concert parties will weaken external shareholders' confidence that "management is deeply in the same boat as minority shareholders."

  So Q6 should be given a medium-to-slightly-positive score, not a high one. The founder-chairman, industry experience, and long-term project investment are genuine pluses; but the shareholding ratio is no longer very high, and concert-party reduction is under way, so the strength of the alignment is clearly discounted. What is most worth verifying next is not slogans but shareholding stability after Shenyang Investment's reduction ends, whether any H-share financing, if it lands, truly goes toward high-end powder expansion and R&D, and whether the company, after Q1 2026 cash-flow pressure, can prove these investments are not merely a long-dated narrative through order fulfillment, gross-margin stability, and operating-cash-flow repair.

  Jun 8, 2026
• QIf it disappeared tomorrow, how much would customers miss it? Is its growth model sustainable, without relying on harming society or regulation?5/10

  A

  Conclusion: high-end MLCC customers would miss Boqian New Materials, but this "missing" is more like the pain of a supply-chain switch than consumer-brand-style irreplaceability. Its core value lies in the consistency, sphericity, dispersibility, and stable delivery of high-end metal powders such as small-particle-size nickel powder and copper powder; as a drafter of the capacitor-electrode nickel powder industry standard and having disclosed passing ISO9001, IATF-16949, and other quality-system certifications, the company has entered the quality systems of high-reliability electronic-component customers, rather than simply selling bulk metal powder. If it disappeared tomorrow, leading customers could probably find substitute suppliers, but re-validating material formulation, batch stability, yield, and reliability would carry delivery and certification costs in the short term.

  The certification switching cost is real. The research report cites earlier materials mentioning customers including Samsung Electro-Mechanics, Yageo (Taiwan), Walsin Technology (Taiwan), Fenghua Advanced Technology, and Chaozhou Three-Circle, and the 2025 annual report also discloses that the company maintains long-term business cooperation with leading electronic-component enterprises in South Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere; the stronger evidence is the Company X long order, with RMB 233 million already fulfilled from August to December 2025 and denominated in U.S. dollars. This kind of material is not a plug-and-play commodity; once MLCC internal-electrode powder enters a customer's mass-production system, switching suppliers means bearing re-sampling, reliability testing, line-parameter adjustment, and supply-assurance risk, so Boqian has strong stickiness with already-certified customers.

  But customer indispensability cannot be scored full marks, and the biggest deduction is concentration. In 2025 revenue was RMB 1.152 billion and net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 219 million, but the top five customers accounted for 75.98% of annual total sales and the top five suppliers accounted for 74.61% of annual total procurement, showing its dependence on a few large customers and the upstream raw-material system is also high. In other words, customers would miss it because switching is troublesome, quality validation is expensive, and the long order binds deeply; but Boqian would also miss these customers very much, because any change in a large customer's procurement pace could quickly transmit to revenue, capacity utilization, and valuation.

  The growth model currently does not appear to rely on clearly harming society or regulatory arbitrage; the product's end demand mainly comes from AI servers, new-energy vehicles, high-end consumer electronics, and photovoltaic low-silver/silver-free applications, directionally advanced manufacturing and efficiency improvement; however, it is still a metal-powder manufacturer, and growth consumes raw materials such as nickel, copper, and silver, and brings pressure on production safety, dust, energy consumption, environmental approvals, and supply-chain compliance. In Q1 2026 revenue was RMB 410 million and net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 71.63 million, but operating cash flow was -RMB 149 million, which the company explains was mainly due to increased raw-material purchases; meanwhile the 640-tonne project plans investment of RMB 120 million and a 36-month construction period, and still requires some approvals, with uncertain progress and returns. So the judgment for Q7 is: customer stickiness is medium-high and social sustainability is neutral-to-positive, but supply-chain concentration, raw-material working-capital occupation, and expansion compliance are constraints that must be continuously tracked.

  Jun 8, 2026
• QWhat are this business's unit economics (gross margin, incremental returns)? Do they get better or worse as scale grows? Where is the money earned spent?5/10

  A

  Conclusion: Boqian New Materials' unit economics improved markedly in 2025, but the quality is driven by "high-end product ramp + customer certification + rising capacity utilization," not by simply making capacity larger necessarily earning more. The profit side has already given positive signals: 2025 revenue of RMB 1.152 billion, net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 219 million, and a weighted-average ROE of 13.52%; by product, metal-powder gross margin was 35.41%, nickel-based product gross margin 37.54%, and copper-based product gross margin 26.87%. This shows the company has a certain processing premium on high-end nickel-based powder, and after scale expansion in 2025 gross margin was not diluted but lifted by product mix and order quality.

  After scale expands, it currently leans "better," but the condition is clear: incremental scale must land on high-spec nickel powder, exports, direct sales, and products validated by leading customers. The most valuable point in the research report is not capacity itself but that customers are willing to pay for particle size, consistency, dispersibility, and supply stability; therefore, when high-end MLCC, AI-server, and automotive-electronics demand pulls small-particle-size nickel powder, Boqian's incremental revenue has a chance to bring higher gross margin. But this is not unconstrained compounding; if new capacity shifts toward low-margin categories, customers press prices, or expansion runs ahead of order fulfillment, unit economics will retreat from a "high-end material premium" to "manufacturing depreciation and utilization pressure."

  Cash flow is the most realistic constraint of this business. In Q1 2026 revenue was RMB 410 million and net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 71.63 million, but operating cash flow was -RMB 149 million because of increased raw-material purchases; full-year 2025 operating cash flow was also only RMB 135 million, down 54.35% year over year. That is, the income statement is improving, but free-cash conversion has not improved in step for now, and growth needs to prepay raw materials, inventory, receivables, and production lines. For Q8, this means "gross-margin improvement" is real, but "incremental returns" still depend on cash collection, raw-material turnover, and capacity ramp, and cannot be judged by net-profit growth alone.

  The money earned is mainly spent in three places: raw-material stocking, capacity expansion, and maintaining technology and customer certification. On the expansion side, the company has announced a project for annual output of 640 tonnes of ultrafine metal powder materials, with planned investment of about RMB 120 million, a 36-month construction period, funded by its own funds or bank loans. Customers and raw materials are another layer of constraint: in 2025 the top five customers accounted for 75.98% of sales and the top five suppliers accounted for 74.61% of procurement, and meanwhile the Company X long order discloses an "average raw-material price plus processing fee" pricing model, where raw-material price fluctuations affect selling price and sales value. So the upside of this business is that customer stickiness and process premium can amplify scale effects, and the downside is that cash flow, raw-material prices, a few large customers, and the expansion pace will jointly determine whether unit economics can keep improving.

  Jun 8, 2026
• QFor it to rise fivefold in ten years, which conditions must hold simultaneously? Are these conditions realistic? What expectations does today's share price imply?2/10

  A

  Conclusion first: starting from the 2026-06-08 closing price of RMB 173.00 and total market cap of about RMB 45.257 billion, a fivefold gain over ten years for Boqian New Materials means the market cap must reach about RMB 226.3 billion. This is not a completely impossible "zero-probability story," but it requires revenue, profit margin, customer expansion, capacity fulfillment, and valuation multiple to all stand on the optimistic side; at today's price, the market has already prepaid very high fulfillment expectations, rather than offering an overlooked cheap option.

  First, the mathematical threshold. The company's 2025 revenue was RMB 1.152 billion, net profit attributable to shareholders RMB 219 million, and EPS RMB 0.84, so the current price corresponds to a static PE of about 206x; Q1 2026 revenue of RMB 410 million, net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 71.63 million, and operating cash flow of -RMB 149 million imply a simply annualized PE of about 160x. If ten years out the market still gives 60x PE, a RMB 226.3 billion market cap requires about RMB 3.77 billion of net profit, about 17 times 2025 net profit; if it gives 50x, it requires about RMB 4.53 billion, about 21 times; if it falls back to 40x, it still requires about RMB 5.66 billion, about 26 times. Backing out from a 25% net margin, a 50-60x terminal valuation also requires about RMB 15.1-18.1 billion of revenue, about 13-16 times 2025 revenue.

  To realize this path, at least five things must hold simultaneously: first, the demand for ultrafine nickel powder in high-end MLCCs driven by AI servers, automotive electronics, and high-end consumer electronics keeps expanding for ten years, not just ramping for two or three years; second, the Company X long order is not just a one-off order for 2025-2029 but is smoothly fulfilled, renewed, and brings in more international leading customers to replicate; third, second curves such as copper powder, silver-coated copper powder, alloy powder, and the 640-tonne ultrafine-metal-powder project truly ramp, expanding the company from nickel powder leader into a high-end powder platform; fourth, gross margin and net margin are not eaten up by raw materials, FX, depreciation, and price competition, and operating cash flow must also repair from the Q1 2026 negative reading; fifth, customer-concentration risk must decline, because in 2025 the top five customers already accounted for 75.98% of sales, and if growth mainly relies on a few customers, the market will find it hard to still give a platform-type high valuation ten years out.

  Are these conditions realistic? The industry foundation is real; the company has process, standard-setting, leading-customer certification, and long orders, and cannot be treated as pure theme; but a fivefold gain over ten years requires, beyond "real business continuing to grow strongly," an added layer of "the valuation multiple not clearly retreating over the long term." That is quite demanding: even if net profit reaches RMB 2 billion, if the market only gives 40-50x, that is only RMB 80-100 billion of market cap, still far from RMB 226.3 billion; conversely, to support a fivefold gain on a PE above 100x would mean the market still treats it ten years out as a high-speed scarce platform rather than a mature material manufacturer. Today's closing price of RMB 173.00 corresponds to about RMB 45.257 billion of market cap, already implying multiple expectations of smooth Company X long-order ramp, continued upward revision of AI/automotive-electronics demand, advancement of the H-share financing or internationalization narrative, cash-flow repair, and successful platformization. In other words, the current share price is not pricing "normal fulfillment" but pre-pricing "relatively high-quality fulfillment"; a fivefold gain over ten years can be tracked as a blue-sky scenario, but is not suitable as the base case.

  Jun 8, 2026
• QWhy hasn't the market realized all this yet? Is it that they can't understand it, look down on it, or can't see far enough? What will become the "narrative inflection point"?3/10

  A

  Conclusion first: the market has not entirely failed to realize it—it has already partly realized it, and has even prepaid a stretch of the long-term narrative into the share price. On a unified basis, Boqian New Materials closed at RMB 173.00 on 2026-06-08 with a total market cap of about RMB 45.257 billion; compared with the company's disclosed 2025 revenue of RMB 1.152 billion and net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 219 million, the static valuation is already very high. This shows the market is not "looking down on" it but is already trading high-end MLCC nickel powder, the Company X long order, AI servers, automotive electronics, and H-share financing imagination.

  What is truly not fully priced in is fulfillment quality, not the four words "AI materials." The market's hesitation is mainly for three reasons: one, Boqian sits in the MLCC upstream materials segment, and its value-chain position is not as intuitive as chips, servers, or finished machines; two, Company X's identity is still not public, and although the long order has fulfillment, outsiders find it hard to precisely gauge the ramp pace; three, growth is consuming cash, with the company's Q1 2026 revenue of RMB 410 million and net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 71.63 million, but operating cash flow of -RMB 149 million. Layered with the controlling shareholder's and concert parties' shareholding having dropped to 25.00%, the market will demand more operating evidence rather than just listening to the growth story.

  So I believe the narrative inflection point should not be "yet another AI research report" or "continuing to stress domestic substitution," but the simultaneous appearance of four types of verifiable events. First, Company X long-order fulfillment value, nickel powder sales volume, export revenue, and export gross margin beat expectations for several consecutive quarters; second, operating cash flow repairs from the Q1 2026 negative reading, proving that expansion is not stacked up by over-drawing working capital; third, the proposal to issue H-shares and list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange main board was approved by the 2026-06-05 extraordinary general meeting, but subsequent regulatory filing, Hong Kong Stock Exchange procedures, issue size, and use of proceeds still remain to be seen; fourth, the 640-tonne ultrafine-metal-powder project and new products such as copper powder, silver-coated copper powder, and alloy powder move from "projects and samples" into substantive revenue contribution.

  Attributing it via "can't understand, look down on, or can't see far enough," I would say: the traditional market once found it a bit hard to understand, but now the main issue is that it cannot see the fulfillment timeline clearly; thematic capital sees the long-term story but sometimes cannot see far, simplifying it into merely an AI tag. The truly upward narrative inflection point is the market switching from "believing it is an AI/automotive-electronics materials upstream" to "confirming it can simultaneously fulfill the long order, cash flow, H-share financing, and new-product platformization." Conversely, if H-share progress slows, cash flow keeps deteriorating, shareholder reductions continue, or long-order fulfillment falls short, this narrative will also retreat from "scarce growth platform" back into "high-volatility manufacturing stock."

  Jun 8, 2026