GoDaddy Long-Term Value Investment Research

【Fact】The charging model is mainly subscription and renewal. Domains can be subscribed to for multiple years, while websites, email, marketing tools, and other products are also mostly monthly or annual subscriptions. The company typically collects cash when the customer signs up, then recognizes revenue over the service period, creating large deferred revenue and a strong upfront-cash-flow profile. At the end of Q1 2026, total deferred revenue was about $3.451 billion, a substantial portion of which will be recognized over the next several years.

【Fact】The biggest strengths of this business are "high recurrence, fast cash collection, and a diversified customer base." In 2025, the company's customer retention rate of about 85% continued the stable level of the past five years; after customers had used the service for more than three years, retention was about 90%; and more than 89% of 2025 revenue came from existing customers from the prior year. The company also disclosed that a cohort of customers acquired in 2017 had contributed about $3 billion of cumulative bookings by the end of 2025, on the basis of about $253 million of marketing spend in that year, showing very high customer lifetime value.

【Fact】The cost structure is also easy to understand. Domain-registration costs are essentially registration fees paid to registries, while the A&C business is more about software development, marketing, customer service, and revenue sharing with third-party products. In 2025 costs and expenses, cost of revenue was $1.802 billion, technology and development was $842 million, marketing was $375 million, and customer care was $289 million; together these made up the main cost base. Capital expenditures were extremely low, only $23.90 million in 2025.

【Fact】The company does not depend on a single large customer. The annual report clearly discloses that no single customer accounted for more than 10% of revenue. The real external dependencies come from ICANN accreditation and rules, domain registries, especially VeriSign's wholesale pricing, and key partners such as Microsoft 365.

【View】If the stock market were closed for the next five years, I would be willing to own this business, but only with the understanding that it is not a "perfect-moat super-compounder." It is instead a "high-cash-flow, above-average-moat digital infrastructure plus SMB software platform that requires continued monitoring of technological evolution." It is transparent enough. The issue is not "I cannot understand it," but "will the future competitive landscape become harder?" That is why it earns an understandability score above average, but not at the very top.

Industry Competition and Moat

Industry attractiveness score: 3.5/5. Moat strength score: 3.5/5.

【Fact】GoDaddy's industry spans two sub-industries. The first is domain registration and digital-identity infrastructure; the second is SMB-facing website building, online presence, marketing, and commerce software. The former is more mature and more stable; the latter still has structural growth room, but competition is more intense. In 2025, GoDaddy managed about 21% of global domains. At the same time, global domain registrations reached 392.5 million in Q1 2026, up 6.5% year over year, showing that underlying demand has not disappeared.

【Fact】GoDaddy is a global leader on the domain side. The company disclosed that it had about 81 million domains under management at the end of 2025; by the end of Q1 2026, this figure had rebounded to 81.391 million. A domain is not merely a low-priced product. It is also the starting point for the customer relationship with the company: in 2023, about 92% of customers had purchased at least one domain.

【Fact】But the domain industry is not high growth. GoDaddy's domains under management fell from about 85 million at the end of 2023 to about 80.793 million at the end of 2025, and although they rebounded to 81.391 million in Q1 2026, the overall trend shows that the domain side is not a high-growth story. Meanwhile, the company's full-year 2026 guidance also shows total revenue midpoint growth of about 6%, with A&C growing at a low double-digit rate and Core growing at a low single-digit rate.

【Fact】Direct and indirect competitors include Wix, Shopify, IONOS, and a broader set of website-building, commerce-platform, and AI website-building tools. Competitors do not necessarily fight head-on in "domains," but they compete for the "first stop for entrepreneurs" entry point. Wix's Q1 2026 revenue grew 14% year over year, and it emphasized its self-developed AI model and Base44; IONOS had a 36.8% adjusted EBITDA margin in 2025, and Q1 2026 revenue grew 5.7% year over year. This shows that the category is not short of capable competitors.

【Fact】GoDaddy's moat is not a single point, but a combination: First, brand. The company describes itself as one of the best-known internet brands in the United States and had high global recognition as of 2025. Second, scale. More than 20 million customers and more than 80 million domains create advantages in procurement, marketing, and cross-selling. Third, switching costs. Once domains, email, websites, SEO, payments, and marketing tools are bundled together, migration creates disruption risk. Fourth, channels and operations. About 5,700 GoDaddy Guides provide human-assisted support, which many purely self-service products do not have. Fifth, negative working capital. Cash is collected before revenue is recognized, which is itself an economic advantage.

【Inference】I think its moat is currently stable to slightly narrowing. The stable side is that the existing customer base, brand, domain entry point, and customer-service system remain effective. The narrowing side is that AI is lowering the difficulty of creating websites and may also shift "who owns the entrepreneur entry point." If users increasingly rely on AI assistants, social platforms, or e-commerce platforms to build sites and acquire customers directly, GoDaddy's traditional starting-point advantage could weaken.

【View】Therefore, I define GoDaddy as "an above-average company in a good industry," rather than "the absolute king in a top-tier industry." More precisely, it is a company that continuously monetizes the mature traffic entry point of domains into high-value SMB software and services. As long as A&C keeps expanding, it is a good business; once A&C stalls, the market will reprice it as a low-growth domain distributor.

Management and Capital Allocation

Management and capital allocation score: 3.0/5.

【Fact】Current CEO Aman Bhutani has served as chief executive officer since September 2019, and CFO Mark McCaffrey has been in office since June 2021. In recent years, management has indeed moved the company from "revenue growth first" toward "margin and free cash flow first." In 2025, NEBITDA reached $1.586 billion, up 13.6% year over year, and operating cash flow grew 24.2% year over year.

【Fact】In terms of shareholder alignment, insider ownership is not high. According to the 2026 proxy statement, the CEO held about 734,000 shares and the CFO held about 84,000 shares, both below 1% of total shares outstanding; management incentives mainly depend on equity awards and performance compensation rather than large personal ownership.

【Fact】The compensation system is not obviously distorted. In 2025 short-term incentives, the company-performance component was split 50% bookings and 50% NEBITDA, with revenue and unlevered FCF metrics removed. This adjustment helps avoid a simple pursuit of scale, but it also means management may prefer margins and operating performance over absolute free cash flow or intrinsic value per share.

【Fact】On capital allocation, the company does not pay dividends and mainly relies on buybacks. It conducted large-scale buybacks continuously from 2021 through Q1 2026, reducing diluted weighted-average shares from 171.1 million in 2021 to 134.3 million in Q1 2026, a decline of about 21.5%. At the end of 2025, the company still had $2.165 billion of repurchase authorization, and at the end of Q1 2026 it still had $1.886 billion authorized.

【Fact】But the "price discipline" of buybacks deserves only a middling grade. Early buyback prices were lower: the 2021 ASR average was about $72.99, and the 2022 ASR average was about $81.50; but the roughly 4.4 million shares delivered under the 2025 ASR had a weighted-average price of $176.02, while the current share price is about $85.83. This shows management is willing to repurchase heavily, but failed to show clear restraint when the stock was overvalued.

【Fact】In recent years, the company has not relied on large-scale M&A to drive growth. The main strategic themes in 2023-2025 looked more like product optimization, divesting some hosting assets, improving margins, and advancing AI/Airo, rather than expanding through major acquisitions.

【Fact】Governance is not flawless. In 2023, the company identified a material weakness related to income tax and related disclosure-control design. Management and the auditor believed the issue was remediated in 2024, and internal control was effective again at the end of 2024.

【View】My conclusion is: management is generally honest and execution is strong, but capital allocation is not "Buffett-level top tier." They have proved they can improve margins and cash flow, but they have not yet proved they are excellent at adjusting the pace of buybacks between overvaluation and undervaluation. This matters for long-term shareholders because GoDaddy pays no dividends, so buybacks are almost the entire shareholder-return tool.

Financial Quality and Owner Earnings

【Fact】The table below summarizes key financial data from 2021 to 2025. 2021-2023 data come from the 2023 10-K; 2024-2025 data come from the 2025 10-K; the latest leverage and operating metrics for Q1 2026 come from the Q1 2026 report and Q1 earnings release. Some margins and net debt figures in the table are self-calculated based on disclosed data.

【Fact】Start with growth quality. Revenue CAGR from 2021 to 2025 was about 6.7%, not explosive; but operating cash flow CAGR was about 17%-18%, clearly faster than revenue. The reasons were better product mix, a higher A&C share, improved marketing efficiency, and extremely low capital expenditures. A&C increased from 29.6% of revenue in 2021 to 38.2% in 2025, and 2025 A&C segment EBITDA margin reached 45.4%, while Core was also 33.0%. This shows the company is migrating toward a higher-quality revenue structure.

【Fact】Profit quality cannot be judged only by net income. Net income in 2023 and 2024 was materially affected by one-time tax benefits: 2024 included a $267.4 million non-cash tax benefit related to the Desert Newco reorganization; 2023 was mainly affected by the release of U.S. deferred tax valuation allowances. 2025 still included a $34.60 million one-time tax benefit. Therefore, GoDaddy's true economic earnings power should be assessed more through operating income, operating cash flow, and free cash flow than GAAP net income.

【Fact】Cash flow is very strong, but it needs to be broken down correctly. 2025 operating cash flow was $1.599 billion. Under the GAAP definition of operating cash flow minus capital expenditures, free cash flow was about $1.576 billion; company-defined free cash flow added back cash restructuring expenses on top of that, reaching $1.614 billion. 2025 net income was $875 million, so FCF was clearly above net income. Q1 2026 operating cash flow was $472 million, and free cash flow was $474 million.

【Fact】Why is cash flow so good? First, customer prepayments and the deferred-revenue model; second, extremely low capital expenditures; third, the company has so far still benefited from large DTAs, so U.S. federal and state cash income-tax burdens have historically been very low. In 2025, the company's book income-tax expense was $145 million, but cash taxes paid were only $16.50 million. This difference is highly favorable to near-term free cash flow, but it cannot be extrapolated indefinitely over the long term.

【Fact】The balance sheet is not "relaxed," but it is not dangerous either. At the end of Q1 2026, the company had about $1.262 billion of cash, about $3.823 billion of total debt, and about $2.561 billion of net debt. Using 2025 NEBITDA of $1.586 billion, net debt/NEBITDA was about 1.6 times. 2025 operating income of $1.127 billion covered interest expense of $151 million by about 7.5 times. This means leverage is manageable, but it is certainly not risk-free.

【Fact】The working-capital structure also reflects the advantages of the business model. The company basically has no inventory risk in the traditional manufacturing sense; accounts receivable are small, only $83.10 million at the end of 2025; accounts payable were $67.50 million; and prepaid domain registration fees totaled about $753 million, reflecting the cost-payment rhythm between the company and registries. At the end of Q1 2026, deferred revenue further increased to $3.451 billion. Overall, GoDaddy is a classic "collect first, perform later" good model.

【Fact】There are three financial issues to watch. First, equity-based compensation is not low, at $317.8 million in 2025. Second, there was a material weakness in tax internal controls in 2023, although it has been remediated. Third, company-defined FCF adds back cash restructuring expenses, while restructuring actually occurred continuously from 2023 to 2025, so it cannot be treated entirely as an item that will "never recur."

【View】Using an "owner earnings" approach, I would be more conservative than management's definition. I would start from 2025 operating cash flow of $1.599 billion, deduct $23.90 million of capital expenditures to get $1.576 billion, then treat equity-based compensation as a real shareholder cost, and apply some conservatism to the growth-related working-capital benefit from deferred revenue. On that basis, GoDaddy's conservative Owner Earnings in 2025 were roughly between $1.1 billion and $1.25 billion; if you fully accept the "non-cash" nature of negative working capital and equity-based compensation, the number would be closer to $1.58 billion.

【View】Based on the current market capitalization of about $11.53 billion, the current share price implies a conservative owner-earnings multiple of about 9-11 times; using the company's looser free-cash-flow definition, the multiple is slightly above 7 times. This explains why I think the stock is not expensive, and also why the margin of safety is still not thick enough: cheapness depends on whether you believe these cash flows can last for ten years, not merely for another two years.

Valuation, Margin of Safety, and Opportunity Comparison

【Fact】As of May 29, 2026, GDDY's latest trading price was about $85.83, and market capitalization was about $11.53 billion. The company's website showed a same-day delayed quote of about $87.95; the valuation below consistently uses $85.83.

Method 1: Owner Earnings Discount Method

【Assumption】I use three scenarios. I do not treat management-defined FCF in full as cash that can be distributed over the long term. Instead, I set "conservative owner earnings" at a starting point of $1.1 billion to $1.3 billion, and combine this with different growth rates, discount rates, and terminal growth rates for valuation. These assumptions are my judgments, not company guidance.

【View】The core meaning of this model is simple: If you believe GoDaddy is merely a "slow-growth but stable cash cow," today's price is only ordinary; if you believe A&C, AI tools, and continued buybacks can lift per-share cash flow over the long term, then the current price is clearly low. The most fragile assumption behind the valuation result is not the discount rate, but the sustainability and growth quality of Owner Earnings. Relevant operating inputs include about 6% midpoint revenue growth in 2026, low double-digit A&C growth, a free cash flow target of about $1.8 billion, and current net debt of about $2.56 billion.

Method 2: Relative Valuation Method

【Fact】Using the current price and 2025 official data, GoDaddy currently roughly trades at: P/E of about 13.8 times (based on 2025 diluted EPS of $6.22), P/FCF of about 7.1-7.3 times (based on 2025 free cash flow of $1.576 billion to $1.614 billion), and EV/NEBITDA of about 8.9 times (based on current market capitalization, Q1 2026 net debt, and 2025 NEBITDA). PB is not very meaningful for GoDaddy because long-term large buybacks have made book equity very thin.

【Fact】Peer comparison requires great care because comparable-company quality differs widely. Wix's current market capitalization is about $3.12 billion, 2025 free cash flow was $573 million, Q1 2026 cash, deposits, and marketable securities exceeded $2 billion, debt was about $1.127 billion, and the capital structure was clearly closer to net cash. VeriSign's current market capitalization is about $26.198 billion and P/E is about 31.5 times, representing a purer and stronger domain-registry monopoly asset. IONOS had 2025 revenue of EUR1.317 billion and adjusted EBITDA of EUR485.2 million, with a margin of 36.8%. In other words, GDDY sits between a "high-moat, low-growth infrastructure asset" and a "high-growth, AI-driven platform asset," so its valuation is usually squeezed in the middle, but it can also be pushed lower during pessimistic periods.

【View】Relative valuation leads me to this conclusion: GoDaddy is currently meaningfully cheaper than the valuation implied by its own "good company" narrative, but there are real reasons why it is also cheaper than some peers with stronger moats. The reason is not that the market "cannot see the cash flow," but that the market worries whether this is a cash machine that is maturing and whose entry-point rules will be rewritten by AI. Put differently, it is probably "discounted," but not "obviously cheap without thought."

Method 3: Asset and Liquidation Value Method

【Fact】GoDaddy is not suitable for PB or liquidation-value analysis as the main valuation method. At the end of 2025, the company had total assets of $8.035 billion, including goodwill of $3.633 billion, net intangible assets of $986 million, and deferred tax assets of $1.053 billion; at the end of Q1 2026, total debt was $3.823 billion and net debt was $2.561 billion. In other words, this is not a business where asset discounts protect your investment. It must prove its value through sustained cash flow.

【View】Therefore, my valuation ranges are as follows: Conservative intrinsic value range: $70-$95; Reasonable intrinsic value range: $100-$130; Optimistic intrinsic value range: $150-$190. At the current $85.83, it has roughly a 20%-30% discount to the "reasonable value midpoint," but almost no margin of safety against the "conservative value midpoint." This is why I assign a "Cautious Buy, but with no obvious margin of safety" rating.

【View】For corresponding price bands, my judgment is: Ideal buy range: $70-$80; Acceptable holding range: $80-$110; Clearly overvalued range: above $130. If you are a very conservative value investor, it is better to wait for the price to get closer to around $75; if you place more weight on long-term free-cash-flow compounding, you can consider buying in batches now rather than taking a large position all at once.

【Fact】Compared with alternative opportunities, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is about 4.45%, Moody's Aaa corporate bond yield is about 5.42%, and SPY, the S&P 500 ETF, currently trades at about $756.48. GoDaddy's expected return must be meaningfully higher than the roughly 5% yield on high-grade bonds to compensate for single-technology-stock risk, legal litigation, and business-model-change risk. In my estimate, GoDaddy's conservative/neutral/optimistic long-term annualized returns roughly correspond to 4%-7% / 8%-12% / 13%-17%.

【View】So buying GoDaddy is not clearly superior to buying the index. It may simply provide better single-stock odds at the current price. If you want "low-maintenance, diversified returns that do not require close tracking," the index is more suitable. If you are willing to keep tracking A&C growth, DUM, ARPU, litigation, and buyback discipline, then GoDaddy deserves one of the limited slots in a portfolio. If a portfolio can hold only 5 assets, I think it is a borderline inclusion, not a must-own.

Risks, Bear Case, and Disconfirmation Conditions

【Fact】The most important risk is first competition and technological substitution. GoDaddy itself emphasizes in its annual report that AI, agentic AI, and rapidly evolving technologies are both opportunities and risks. Wix has already explicitly emphasized strong progress in its self-developed AI model and Base44 in Q1 2026. If the entrepreneur entry point is captured by other platforms, the value of GoDaddy's domain entry point will decline.

【Fact】The second risk is maturation of the core domain business and pressure on DUM. GoDaddy's DUM fell from 85 million in 2023 to 80.793 million in 2025, and although it rebounded to 81.391 million in Q1 2026, the overall trend shows that the domain side is not a high-growth story. Meanwhile, full-year 2026 guidance shows only low single-digit growth for Core revenue.

【Fact】The third risk is regulatory and supply-chain-like dependence. GoDaddy's domain business depends on ICANN accreditation and rules, and is also affected by registries, especially VeriSign's wholesale prices. The annual report clearly discloses that if registries or ICANN raise fees, operating results would be significantly affected; VeriSign has announced that .com registration wholesale prices will rise in November 2026.

【Fact】The fourth risk is legal risk. As of the 2025 annual report, in the Express Mobile litigation, the jury entered a $170 million damages verdict against GoDaddy and found willful infringement. The plaintiff also sought to increase part of the damages to $370 million and add about $87 million of interest. Although this is not fatal relative to GoDaddy's cash-flow capacity, it is definitely not a small risk that can be ignored.

【Fact】The fifth risk is capital allocation and equity-based compensation. GoDaddy's 2025 equity-based compensation expense was $317.8 million, and some large 2025 buybacks occurred at prices far above the current share price, showing that management is willing to buy back stock but has not proved top-tier discipline in "buy low and stop high."

【Fact】The sixth risk is that the financial appearance is better than the true steady state. Historically very low cash taxes came from DTAs, and 2025 cash taxes were only $16.50 million. Once the tax shield is used up in the future, truly distributable cash flow will normalize downward. Although the company remediated the previous tax-related material weakness in internal control in 2024, this also reminds us that accounting and tax quality cannot be taken lightly here.

【Strongest Bear Case】 The strongest bearish logic is: GoDaddy is actually a mature domain distributor that the market has mistakenly treated as a "SaaS-like compounder." If A&C ultimately cannot become a high-quality, sticky second growth curve and merely raises ARPU through promotions and bundling, the company's long-term growth will fall back to the low single digits. At the same time, AI makes website building, digital identity, and customer acquisition more platformized, diluting the value of GoDaddy's domain entry point. In that scenario, the market will no longer give it a "high-quality platform" valuation, and will instead price it as a low-growth, levered cash cow. This bearish logic is not absurd, because 2026 guidance already shows total revenue midpoint growth of only about 6%, and the market clearly revised valuation expectations downward after the guidance release.

【Facts That Would Disconfirm the Investment Thesis】 If the following facts appear in the future, I would consider the original investment thesis broken: several key indicators deteriorate continuously, such as A&C revenue growth falling below high single digits and staying there for more than two years, customer retention dropping materially from about 85% to below 82%, ARPU growth stalling while DUM keeps declining, net debt/NEBITDA rising above 2.5 times, equity-based compensation staying high for a long time while share count no longer declines, and major litigation cash outflows far exceeding expectations. If these occur, GoDaddy would no longer be a "platform with increasingly high-quality cash flow," but a "mature business using buybacks to maintain the appearance of per-share growth."

Open questions and limitations. I have not converted all peers' real-time valuation multiples into a fully unified methodology, because GoDaddy, Wix, VeriSign, and IONOS differ greatly in business model and capital structure. In addition, the final outcome of the Express Mobile litigation, the pace at which the company's tax shield is consumed, and the true commercialization quality of Airo/AI tools all require continuous verification in future financial reports.

Investment Checklist and Final Judgment

Investment Checklist

【Final Rating】 Cautious Buy

【One-Sentence Investment Thesis】 GoDaddy is a high-cash-flow, capital-light, understandable digital platform for entrepreneurs. Its current valuation has clearly fallen back into a researchable range, but its moat is not impregnable, and the margin of safety is not thick enough for conservative investors to take a large position without much thought.

【Core Bull Case】

• Existing revenue is very stable. In 2025, more than 89% of revenue came from customers that already existed in the prior year, and customer retention was about 85%, showing clear renewal characteristics.

• Cash-flow quality is excellent. 2025 operating cash flow was $1.599 billion, and capital expenditures were only $23.90 million, showing an extremely capital-light profile.

• A&C is lifting revenue quality. It grew 14.3% year over year in 2025, and segment EBITDA margin reached 45.4%, making it the key growth engine for value over the next decade.

• Net debt/NEBITDA is about 1.6 times, leverage is manageable, and the share count has contracted meaningfully since 2021, supporting long-term per-share value accumulation.

• The current price corresponds to about 9-11 times conservative Owner Earnings. If A&C and AI platformization progress as hoped, valuation upside exists.

【Core Bear Case】

• The core domain business is closer to a mature market. DUM declined from 2023 to 2025, and 2026 Core guidance is only low single-digit growth.

• The moat comes more from brand and distribution than irreplaceable technology; AI may lower barriers to website building and the entrepreneur entry point.

• The average price of large 2025 buybacks was about $176, far above the current share price, so capital-allocation discipline is not excellent.

• Equity-based compensation is high, and the very low cash tax burden is supported by DTAs, so reported free cash flow may be above the long-term normal state.

• The Express Mobile litigation involves potentially large cash outflows and uncertainty.

【Key Assumptions】

• A&C can still maintain high single-digit to low double-digit growth for many years.

• Customer retention and ARPU do not structurally deteriorate.

• GoDaddy can turn AI into a tool that strengthens customer relationships and conversion rates, rather than being marginalized by AI platforms.

• Net leverage remains within a manageable range, and future buybacks are not carried out aggressively in clearly overvalued zones.

• Litigation and regulatory risks do not evolve into events severe enough to damage the balance sheet.

【Fair Buy Price】 $70-$80. The basis is that this range roughly corresponds to the midpoint to upper end of my conservative valuation, leaving a more comfortable margin of safety for a company with a "medium moat + legal/technology uncertainty."

【Target Holding Period】 At least 5-10 years, and more appropriately more than 10 years. This is not a stock suited to winning through quarterly volatility. The real return comes from A&C penetration, buybacks, per-share cash-flow growth, and valuation repair.

【Expected Annualized Return】

• Conservative scenario: 4%-7%

• Neutral scenario: 8%-12%

• Optimistic scenario: 13%-17%

【Maximum Loss Risk】 In an extreme scenario where "AI rebuilds the entry point, A&C growth stalls, DUM resumes a sustained decline, legal damages expand, and valuation compresses to a low-growth cash-cow multiple," a permanent capital loss of more than 50% is not impossible. This is not the base case, but it must be faced.

【Tracking Indicators】

• A&C revenue growth and A&C segment EBITDA margin

• Core revenue growth and domains under management, or DUM

• Customer retention and ARPU

• Deferred revenue and bookings growth

• Operating cash flow, GAAP FCF, and SBC

• Net debt/NEBITDA

• Changes in cash tax burden and the pace of DTA consumption

• Buyback amount, average buyback price, and share-count changes

• Real commercialization progress of AI products such as Airo/ANS

• Progress of the Express Mobile litigation

【Signals That Would Trigger Reassessment】

• A&C growth clearly steps down and remains lower

• Retention falls below its long-term stable range

• DUM keeps declining and is not offset by ARPU

• Leverage rises materially or the company borrows heavily for buybacks

• Legal-risk amounts expand enough to affect the capital structure

• Management again repurchases aggressively in overvalued zones

• Cash taxes normalize quickly, causing FCF to be materially weaker than expected

• AI tools fail to bring higher conversion and stronger stickiness, and instead weaken GoDaddy's entry-point value

【Final Recommendation】 Calmly put, GoDaddy deserves a place on the long-term watchlist and batch-accumulation list, but it has not reached the point where risk can be ignored and a large position can be justified. If you are a long-term value investor willing to keep tracking operating data, the current price has entered a zone where you can "start buying a little." If you are more conservative and want to see a thick margin of safety immediately, the better strategy remains: wait for a cheaper price, or wait for the moat to be proved more clearly.

This report is based on public information and does not constitute investment advice. Markets carry risk; invest with caution.